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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

THE STATE AND THE LAW

THAT it is the duty of the state to suppress crime, to protect life and property from enemies internal and external, to establish the conditions for the production and distribution of goods, to promote the material well-being and, at least indirectly, the spiritual welfare of the citizens—all this may be taken for granted. These various activities may be summed up in the formula that the state controls the citizens so that their actions may be right and suitable. I use the latter terms in the most innocuous sense, to include the expedient as well as the right, the useful as well as the good. In this generalized sense, the aim of the state is (*a*) moral or practical, and (*b*) its effect is to mould action. The state is an instrument of practical reason. In this paper I would like to point out another and a different activity of the state, in which the latter operates as an instrument of theoretical reason, making knowledge possible—namely, knowledge of the behavior of the citizens. Prediction is the aim, and it is achieved by the promulgation of general laws which in their character as rules of behavior render the actions of citizens determinate and so predictable. Whereas the former function is to ensure rightness of action, the second is to ensure certainty concerning action; the first aims to *modify* action, the second to *cognize* it. Irrespective of whether human action is right or not, it is important to know what it will be. In order that human beings should be able to live together successfully, it is essential that they be able to anticipate one another's actions; I must know what to expect of you, and you of me; a general rule, in the form of law, defines the action, while the state, by its recourse to force, makes the action, as defined, certain. Now, the demand for prediction is non-interventionist; while the demand for rightness operates to change the course of action, the second accepts it for what it is, and only aims to give a true report of it, saying, as it were: let me know the worst. Thus the function of law as a general statement is to bring about clear and distinct ideas concerning the future actions of the citizens.

While legal philosophers have been amply aware of this function of law as predictive, political philosophers have mostly ignored

it, or when they have not ignored it they have failed to emphasize it sufficiently, or when they have emphasized it adequately (as Locke has done) they have failed to separate it properly from the other function of the state, which is the control of conduct so that it may be right and proper.

The need of knowledge is also the need of order in society; without the state, there would be chaos, and the state exists in order to bring about order from chaos. But order is not necessarily good order; laws are not necessarily just. By all means, let the man about to die prepare a will in which he states definitely to whom he proposes to bequeath his property. The will may be most unfair, but at any rate we know where we are when we open it; chaos has been averted and the situation has become well—if unjustly—defined. Two men enter into a contractual relation whereby each promises to the other to perform certain actions—the actions of the one being performed in the expectation that the promised actions of the other will be carried out. The state uses the sanction of force to back the contract and so to make the expectations certain. You will say that there can be no certainty; the other man may fail to carry out his part of the contract despite the threat of punishment. But in the first place, if he does this he will be punished and made to give compensation; thus, the proposition about the future is a disjunction: either he will behave thus and so, or else he will be made to pay. In the second place, certainty is a relative matter; there is no absolute certainty anywhere.

Again, it is often urged—and urged rightly—that the word "law" is used ambiguously when it is made to refer both to political and to natural law. Political law is a command; natural law is a description. Yet the ambiguity also corresponds to a similarity between the two kinds of law. The purpose of force in the state is to make a command effective, to ensure that what is commanded is done. Force is the means to convert, as far as possible, a norm of action into a description of action. Of course, the means do not always succeed in bringing about the end; but, at any rate, we can say validly that political law is an imitation of natural law.

When Franklin Roosevelt, in the early part of his service as president, compared himself to a quarter-back who formulates and modifies his policy as he goes, businessmen were rightly disturbed. If you, a businessman, propose to sink money in an undertaking, you would like to know what the taxes will be for some years to come; you do not object necessarily to the fact that taxes will be heavy (although you probably would); what you do complain about is that the tax situation is indefinite. I do not mean to imply that Mr. Roosevelt was wrong in behaving like a quarter-back dur-

ing a football game; besides the need for certainty, there is also the need that policy be just and proper, a need which—it may be—the businessmen had ignored. Yet the complaints did point up the relevance of order as well as of rightness in society.

The charioteer of the state drives two horses, the white horse of justice and the black horse of order; and he aims to drive the two horses in the same direction. As often as not, the charioteer succeeds. To return to our example of the unjust will, the law provides, in many states, that the husband must bequeath a certain minimum of his property to his wife. There is no necessary conflict between the two aims, and ideally they reinforce one another. Good ends can be best secured when they operate upon materials which have a determinate, predictable nature. Bridges can be built because steel and stone and wood obey definite laws of cause and effect. Purpose can utilize mechanism. But in the actual world and in the short run, these two aims—the moral order and the mechanical order—are often at variance; and the charioteer is puzzled as to which of the two horses to encourage—whether to change a bad law and thus upset a uniformity, or whether to maintain order and perpetuate an injustice. For reasons of clarity, I propose to isolate the aim of order from the total context and even exhibit it in opposition to the other aim of rightness.

Political philosophers have written that the purpose of the state is to protect life and property, to maintain justice and even to create it. Yet surely in many states laws have been unjust, rights have been withheld, and exploitation has been permitted, where not actually encouraged. Shall we say that such states have so far forth failed of their objective, that states are less truly states because they are evil states? I wonder. There is a difference between exploitation of individuals in a state of nature, and exploitation in a state of government. The one is unorganized, the other is organized robbery. What difference does that make, you will retort, so long as I am robbed in fact? Quite a lot, I would answer. When I am robbed in accordance with law, say in the form of exorbitant taxation, the action of robbery proceeds from a general rule and is therefore predictable. The victim, knowing what is to come, prepares for it, perhaps by appropriate saving. Are we told that the purpose of the state is to protect life? Yet there are or have been states in which capital punishment has been adjudged and executed contrary to all moral principle. In effect, such punishment was murder; yet such murder fails of being completely unsocial to the extent that it is according to law. The man whose life has been taken as a punishment for what he has done knew, before he acted, what the consequence of his action would be. When

people enter into a social compact, it goes without saying that they must exercise justice and goodwill to one another; but in addition, they must negotiate and agree upon certain general rules, so that they will know what to expect of one another and of the group. To violate the general rule, even when such violation is for the sake of doing the right thing, is no less unsocial than it is to deal unjustly with one's fellowmen.

It has been supposed that law necessarily establishes equality in a state. After all, is not a law the statement of a uniformity? Thus, it would seem that the law by its very nature brings about justice, even though it be the minimum of justice, namely, equality of unjust treatment or of deprivation by the authorities. Yet law, *qua* a general statement, need not mean similar or equal treatment of all citizens. In many states there is, or has been, one law for the rich and another for the poor; one law for the whites and another for the non-whites. To the extent that such laws are modified to apply to all citizens uniformly or equally, the laws become more democratic and more just, but the laws are not thereby altered in their character as predictive. The essence of law is that actions are categorized, whether the category be of citizen as such, or of rich citizen, or of white citizen. Once actions and agents are brought under a general concept, general rules are established and prediction is rendered possible. When some *kinds* of citizens are on top, and others are at the bottom, and the arrangement is understood, then, although there is inequality, there is order. In such a situation, some social value has been achieved, although not by any means the whole of it.

So far I have considered the instance of a state endowed with a minimum of goodwill, in order the better to bring out the value of order. Let us now pass to examples of a society completely endowed with goodwill. A well-behaved society would still need laws. The city of God, no less than the city of ordinary mortals; the communion of the saints, no less than Plato's thieves (*Rep.* I), must have their general rules. Political philosophers from Plato to Marx have extolled the ideal of rational anarchy when human beings will be so virtuous that the state will become unnecessary and so will wither. In order to avoid confusion, I will distinguish the aspect of force from that of general rules, and I will grant that in the ideal city, force will be dispensable. But if the state is also defined in terms of general rules, then I deny that the state will ever wither, and would maintain that it will flourish even in heaven. A virtuous society is not necessarily a knowing society; while the saints would do the right thing, how would they know what the other saints will do if there are no general rules? And

if they lack that knowledge, how can they live together? After all, we assume that all rational beings—whether saints or sinners—need a language by which to communicate; and language exists in the sense that men agree to use the same words in the same fashion. So with general rules about conduct, which are, in their way, a form of language.

Nevertheless, it may be urged that, in the ideal society without law, human beings will govern their actions by moral principles, and a moral principle is a law. True enough, but the moral law and the law of the state are different kinds of rules. The ideal of courage is indeed universal; everyone should be courageous. But courage in this circumstance and for this individual varies from courage in that circumstance and for that individual—varies, that is to say, as to the behavior that is indicated. In the first case, courage will mean attack, in the second case it means discretion. Thus a moral principle does not formulate a determinate uniformity of behavior, as law does. Plato regards such uniformity as a defect of law; he points out that laws are wholesale regulations making no allowance for individual variations, and that laws are fixed, making no allowance for the changes that time brings about. That is true: laws are abstractions from the concrete moral situation; but the cost is justified by the result, namely, the ability to predict. Law is to morals what science is to common sense: the latter may be more adequate, but science is certainly more exact, by virtue of being abstract. While moral principles are indeterminate, laws are *explicit* rules, relating definite circumstances to definite behavior. The passage from moral to political law is the transition to explicitness.

Let us pursue the analogy with science. In science, a fact is defined by definite criteria so that people agree as to when the fact exists and when it does not. Can we say the same for law—that law defines action in such a way that people agree as to when the action violates the law and when it does not? Hardly. The disputes about the law are notorious. Individuals must have recourse to the courts in order to find out what the law intends; and since judges act only after the fact, there would seem to be no prediction at all. A law achieves definiteness only after it has been interpreted by a judge in a particular case. So long as it is general, it is too vague to be predictive; and after it has been rendered determinate, it is too late for prediction. Nevertheless, there are mitigating factors. The function of the courts is not exhausted in their task of interpreting law; the courts must decide on the facts; they must also officially declare that a given action has violated the law in order that punishment may be administered. Also, the in-

terpretation given of the law by the judges institutes a law for the future; in short, the judges declare general rules, as well as particular applications. We will repeat, then, that the *intent* of the law, whether statutory or common, and as interpreted by the courts, is to provide explicit (as against indeterminate) general rules by which to predict the future. But exactness is not obtainable in the field of social behavior in anything like the degree in which it is achieved by the sciences, including the sciences of social behavior; and therefore law can only approximate the explicitness of scientific statements. But it remains a fact that law aims at such explicitness, so far as circumstances will allow.

The last statement points to a new objection. The natural world (inclusive of the human world) is ordered, lawful, and therefore a field for predictive propositions; what need, then, for the special laws of the state, in their capacity of instruments of prediction? Every natural situation is obviously a definite situation which can be formulated in an explicit statement supplied by science. In order to give an answer to this question, we must look into the general nature of the state, and indeed of all human associations. A human association consists in the joint pursuit of a common aim. Each member of the association is a causal agent along with the rest (in other words, members are joint causes); and order is a harmonization of the social actions in order to bring about a maximum result. Such ordering does not mean that the causal actions are similar. When six people row in a boat, the actions are all alike; but when five row, while the sixth steers, obviously they are not. In buying and selling, one man delivers the goods while the other pays the price; and division of labor entails diversity within harmony.

Let us distinguish the order of nature from the order by agreement. The first enables a given individual to anticipate a cold spell in the winter by buying coal in advance, or enables another to anticipate a demand for overcoats by laying aside a supply of the latter for his business. The order by agreement is an enacted one, and depends on the consent of the human wills. When several people want the same thing, and because joint action will bring about the desired result more effectively, they establish an order which makes joint action possible—an order consisting in general correlations among actions. The laws of an association establish and express these correlations. In the order of nature there is very little chance that efforts will harmonize: for instance, that diverse musical instruments played by diverse musicians without a collective plan will play harmoniously. Thus, a planned harmony is brought about, with its own pattern of correlations ren-

dering a corresponding set of predictions possible, for which the order of nature did not provide. The laws of the state, being backed by force, have the added advantage of being relatively certain. The aim of the state is the good life; the order in the state is the harmonized activity of the citizens; and the correlations among actions are the laws of the state enabling the citizens to make relevant predictions and thus to coöperate in achieving their aim.

It may be objected that the distinction between the two functions of the state, in terms of justice *versus* order, is untenable. Is not justice itself a type of order, a harmony between wills? Is not order itself a moral value and a social good, and therefore an intrinsic end? In a sense this is true; and the difference must be rephrased so as to appear as a distinction within the general framework of ends and of order. Thus, we will say that whereas the demand of justice is a demand for a particular type of order, judged to be good, the demand for law is the demand for order *anyhow*, where the special content of the particular rule is irrelevant. Outside the framework of the state, we find a similar difference in society—the difference between morals and manners. That I should tell the truth is an obligation of morals; that I should take my hat off to a lady, or place the knife to the right of the plate, is an obligation of manners. Both are obligations imposed on every member, but those imposed by manners arise from the need that we should agree on something, no matter what—in order that we may get on together. A rule of manners according to which I clap my hat on my head in greeting a lady would be as suitable as the present one. And so with the law of the state; the *form* of generality is essential, the *content* of the general rule is immaterial. To be sure, the line dividing morals from manners is not exact; there is something of manners in morals, and something of morals in manners. For instance, it might be urged that the requirement to have the knife to the right of the plate is not wholly arbitrary, but arises from the fact that we hold the knife with our right hand, and the fork with our left. (But is not the latter practice arbitrary?)

Thus, granting that both purposes of the state aim at the right, we will say that the first aims at the real right, the second at a nominal right. What is right by law is right by definition; in terms of the old Greek phrase, we will say that justice is by nature, whereas law is a convention (*φύσις* and *νόμος*). Philosophers have claimed that law is an embodiment of reason; that claim may be admitted provided we add the qualification that law embodies nominal reason.

Moral action is action in which the agent is the judge of the rightness of the action; legal action is that in which the judge is the collectivity, or the representative of the collectivity—whether king or majority. The transition from philosophical anarchy to the state of law is that from a society in which each individual acts as he sees right and fit into one in which the individual acts as the collectivity sees right and fit (Locke). It is the transition from private to public judgment, from personal to impersonal action, somewhat like the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism. Protestants claim the right of the private individual to interpret the Bible in the light of his own judgment; Catholics maintain that the tradition should be interpreted by the Church for the individuals.

The statement that while moral action is governed by private judgment, political action is governed by public judgment, needs further explanation. After all, the average moral member of a society acts in agreement with the moral code of his group; thus, it might be argued that his action expresses an inter-subjective value-judgment, no less than does legal action. While there is inter-subjectivity in both, there is a difference in the way this is arrived at. In the moral sphere, I consent to the agreed value as being right objectively; in the legal sphere, I need not so consent. Thus, in a democracy, the minority agrees to abide by the judgment of the majority, although it does not hold that the majority is right. In the sphere of morals, agreement on the code is the outcome of a similarity between the several private judgments; in the sphere of law, agreement is the outcome of the decision to agree.

Furthermore, in the state, the interpretation and the execution of the law are taken out of private hands and entrusted into the hands of courts and police respectively. As Locke says, the individual gives up his right to sit as a judge in his own case, and his right to execute justice; and chooses instead a general umpire who will judge, and police who will punish. Thus, it is not enough that there shall exist laws governing individual behavior; it is important that implementation of the laws be in the hands of official (and not of private) agencies. The latter fact is based on the need of unity in the state, as the only condition of order. When each and every private individual is both judge and executioner, society is in a state of chaos, and certainty is made impossible. Hence, it is wrong for private individuals to "take the law in their own hands," even in order to render justice.

The enemy both of moral and of political order is passion. Pas-

sion drives a man to robbery and murder, and thus frustrates the moral ends of the state; also, passion drives a man to take the law into his own hands, to act from individual judgment and not from general rules, and thus frustrates the need of uniformity. Passion is a factor of confusion and chance, no less than of violence; it is anti-social in a double sense: it defeats justice and goodwill, and it disrupts uniformity of behavior. On the other hand, the state stands for cool and rational behavior; cool because objective and "official"; rational because proceeding from explicit general concepts. Government employs force to suppress both violence and waywardness of behavior, even the waywardness of good impulse.

And now to summarize, revise, and conclude. The state seeks both rightness and certainty, to modify action and to predict it; both being ways of order and of achieving the good life. The first is concerned with the content, the second with the form of the good life. In its first function the state embodies the practical, in its second, the theoretical, reason. Nevertheless, since the state seeks prediction for the sake of effective coöperation, both functions are ultimately practical. Order is instrumental to rightness; yet the two are often in conflict because of the general fact that a technical procedure has its own necessity and nature independently of the conditions imposed upon it by the end which it serves. Thus order is general order and as such may require a sacrifice of goods in particular instances while serving the final end. Law is abstract where morals is concrete; definite and explicit where morals is indeterminate. Morals discriminates between the varieties of circumstance which enter into the goodness of an action; law does not. Moral action issues from private and personal judgment, lawful action is impersonal and official; moral law expresses objective and real values, legal rules are arbitrary and conventional; the first corresponds to real, the second to nominal, reason. In this essay, law has been wrongly or at least too sharply described so as to exclude the factor of rightness. In fact, every law ministers at once to the two needs of rightness and of generality, in various degrees and ways. The writer has chosen to identify law with the literal connotation of the word as a general command, in order to sharpen his point. The most important revision of all is to the effect that the state has no aim of its own, whether moral or legal; the state gets its orders from society. It is society which makes the demands of rightness and order, of morals and manners; the state merely supplies the force to secure the aims of society. In the ideal society of virtuous citizens, force will not be necessary, and so, strictly speaking, the state will disappear. What will remain

will be a society conforming both to morals and to manners, and obeying both real and nominal reason.

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THE ALLEGED PREDICAMENT OF LOGIC

HOW many logicians are aware of the fact that the advocates of not merely one, but of no less than three distinct types of logical theory explicitly admit to being plagued by the so-called logo-centric predicament? Just what is this predicament; what are the ultimate sources of the perplexing difficulty; and how, if at all, may it be overcome? Such are the questions that naturally occur to one, once he has become aware of this state of affairs in contemporary logic, and the purpose of this discussion is to point the way to answering them.

Perhaps the clearest and simplest formulation of the difficulty, as well as the one most familiar at the present time, is that put forward by the symbolic logicians. As Lewis and Langford state it (*Symbolic Logic*, p. 117), ". . . any attempt to develop exact logic by the usual methods of mathematical deduction in general, must involve some circularity. The principles deduced . . . must be taken for granted *before* they can be deduced. This is the case because the principles of deduction must be given before any deduction can be legitimately performed or its validity assessed. And [they add significantly] this circularity cannot be removed by citing such implicit principles of deduction as explicit assumptions." This last statement seems to suggest that such recently attempted subterfuges as to call these principles "extra-logical," or to assign them to a so-called metalogical sphere, is merely to postpone the difficulty and not really to remove it. And although the authors just quoted claim that the "logistic method" of *Principia Mathematica* successfully eludes the predicament, in that, according to it, "the principles of logic are not antecedently presumed as rules of demonstration," apparently other students of that work (e.g., Gödel) are not so sanguine.[1] It is indeed hard to see why, simply because the differentia of this method is that "the first branch of logic to be developed should be the calculus of propositions; that is, the laws which can be stated for all propositions, without regard to the terms and relations of terms, into which the propositions in question might be analyzed" (p. 118), the predicament should thereupon be evaded. The calculus of propositions is a calculus still, subject, therefore, one is entitled

[1] See Carnap's *Logical Syntax of Language*, pp. 220–222 and *passim*.

to suppose, to the rules, regulations, and limitations inherent in its very nature.

In any case this is not the only statement of the predicament extant, and it may very well be that a clearer understanding of all that is involved in it will result from consideration of other, independent formulations. In his *Logische Untersuchungen* (I, sec. 43), for example, Husserl finds himself embarrassed in essentially the same manner. Having convinced himself by a careful investigation of the various possible alternatives, and on sound phenomenological grounds as well, that "pure logic" is, as such, an *a priori*, demonstrative science, he is acute enough to realize the danger confronting him. As he sees it, any science other than logic, *ipso facto* based on premises "heterogeneous" to those of logic, would inevitably be caught in a vicious circle if it attempted, out of its own resources, to demonstrate the principles basic to all demonstration. But Husserl argues—or rather, simply asserts—that logic itself need not be caught in such meshes of its own devising, for the simple reason that in the exceptional case of logic the premises and conclusions are "homogeneous" with each other—that is to say, the subject-matter, as well as the procedure, is purely logical. In any case, he further urges that logic can not, and indeed need not, undertake to prove the propositions which are logically prior to and presupposed by deduction, but rather installs them, in the form of "evident" axioms, at the very forefront, so to speak, of the demonstrations. Thus "the extraordinarily difficult problem of pure logic consists, in the first place, in acquiring, by analysis, those inescapable axioms whose function it is to serve as foundations, and which are irreducible, the ones in terms of the others, save at the cost of circularity; and further, in so forming and ordering the deductions of logical theorems . . . step by step, that not only the premises, but also the principles, of the deductive procedure will be included either among the axioms or the already established theorems."

Such, at any rate, is the ideal, or rather, the program, as Husserl envisages it; but unfortunately, as in so many other respects, his contribution remains a program to the very end—only that and little more. It is, therefore, impossible to estimate accurately the degree of success he might have attained in endeavoring to carry such a program through. *Prima facie*, however, there seems little to choose between it and the rather closely analogous program of the symbolic logicians. Would not Husserl, in the end, have been faced by analogous difficulties, and is it very probable that he would have been much more successful in resolving them? In fact,

is his statement of the program anything more than just another formulation of the problem itself?

There are, of course, many significant differences between Husserl's phenomenological or pure logic and symbolic logic. Traditional formal logic, even when modified and "generalized" after the manner of the symbolic logicians, embraces only the most elementary portions of the whole field marked out for "formal apophantics" to explore; and formal apophantics is only one of three cognate branches of the whole science, the others being "formal ontology" and "transcendental logic." But in spite of this greater elaborateness and comprehensiveness of Husserl's program, and of the aims it envisages, and in spite, too, of the most significant differences in philosophical presuppositions underlying the two types of logical theory in question, they do share the common conviction that logic is as such deductive in procedure. Precisely how this conviction was reached in the two cases does not, for the purposes of this discussion, really matter; but the conviction itself should be borne in mind in the sequel, for it is evidently in some sense upon it that the alleged predicament hinges.

But now it is time to turn to the third type of logical theory whose leading advocate also finds himself involved in the same perplexing predicament. It may indeed come as a surprise to many readers to learn that the reference here is to none other than instrumental logic, as developed by John Dewey. Sincere critics of James and Dewey have as a matter of fact raised the issue in the form of the question: What is the pragmatic, the instrumental value of instrumentalism itself? And that this potentially troublesome question is by no means mere verbal quibbling Dewey explicitly recognizes, and both in his *Essays in Experimental Logic* and in his *Logic; The Theory of Inquiry* he presents a carefully formulated answer. In the *Essays* (p. 78 f.) he explains that ordinarily

> reflection follows so naturally upon its appropriate cue, its issue is so obvious, so practical, the entire relationship is so organic, that once grant the position that thought arises in reaction to specific demand, and there is not the particular type of thinking called logical theory because there is not the practical demand for reflection of that sort. . . . The general theory of reflection, as over against its concrete exercise, appears when occasions for reflection are so overwhelming and so mutually conflicting that specific adequate response in thought is blocked. Again, it shows itself when practical affairs are so multifarious, complicated, and remote from control that thinking is held off from successful passage into them.

But this answer, as quite possibly Dewey himself soon came to realize, is certainly far from satisfactory as a positive basis for de-

veloping a theory of inquiry along instrumentalist lines. In fact it sounds like nothing so much as a counsel of desperation to advise the badly perplexed or confused to resort to thinking in general just when he finds it impossible to think to any purpose on specific problems, in specific situations. In any case an entirely new and different answer is presented in the more recent work; an answer to a question explicitly formulated as that concerning the "origin" and "use" of "primary logical principles." Following Peirce, Dewey explains that "every inferential conclusion that is drawn involves a habit . . . in the *organic* sense of habit, since life is impossible without ways of action sufficiently general to be properly named *habits*" (p. 12). The aim of logic, therefore, is to note and formulate systematically the habits, the guiding principles, involved in every inference, irrespective of differences of subject-matter.

This answer may appear, at first sight, unimpeachable. It seemingly justifies undertaking the solution of a perfectly general problem as a principal aid to the solution of specific problems, one by one. And it is unhampered in its solution by the explicit prescription, *ab initio,* of any restricted or onesided method or procedure, such as deduction. But Dewey claims far more than these comparatively modest virtues for his doctrine, and by these excessive claims—excessive with respect to what may properly be demanded of logic—reveals the fact that he has not yet eluded the real difficulty. He advances the thesis that "logic is autonomous" in a sense which "implies the ultimacy of inquiry in determination of the formal conditions of inquiry."[2] And he continues, "Logic as inquiry into inquiry is, if you please, a circular process; it does not depend upon anything extraneous to inquiry." Hence it precludes, for example, not only resort to *a priori* first principles, but also "resting logic upon metaphysical and epistemological assumptions and presuppositions." Just as traditional empiricism deceived itself in supposing it was merely following the pattern of scientific inquiry, whereas in reality it was "corrupting formulation of scientific inquiry by subjecting the latter to uncritically accepted conclusions of a subjectivistic psychological theory,"[3] so also the assumption, by symbolic logicians, of atomic existential propositions and of a pure reason independent of experience, "destroys the autonomy of logical theory, rendering it dependent upon psychological and epistemological considerations declared by definition

[2] *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry,* p. 20. See also p. 21 and *passim.*

[3] *L. c.,* p. 132; cf. also Russell's criticism of the empiricist's attempt to establish the principles of induction by induction as obviously circular.

to be outside the province of logic" (p. 156 n.). Or again, "under the guise of a valid principle, namely, that logical forms have existential reference, there is slipped in quite another principle; namely, a particular metaphysical conception about existence, and this special *pre*conception is then used to settle the meaning of logical invariants" (p. 390).

Thus Dewey attributes the predicament (namely, the circularity), in his case, to his insistence on the autonomy of logic with respect to subjective psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. And interestingly enough Husserl claims a like autonomy for his "pure logic," though with the passage of time he apparently abandoned at least part of that claim. But no such sweeping declaration of independence is advanced by the symbolic logicians, and Dewey charges that as a matter of fact it could not in their case be defended. And irrespective of all such *claims*, it has always been perfectly obvious to all competent critics that both pure and instrumental logic actually entail or presuppose very definite —and very different!—psychological and metaphysical doctrines.

From these considerations it seems apparent that the alleged predicament, consisting of the apparently inevitable circularity attaching to logical first principles, must have its source elsewhere than in the supposed autonomy of logic. But neither can it be attributed solely to the assumption of the purely deductive character of logic. For while the symbolic logicians and Husserl clearly intimate that this is the real source of the difficulty, instrumental logic rejects this conception of logic as wholly deductive, as wholly unsound, and nevertheless frankly confesses to being entangled in the same meshes of circularity.

What then do symbolic, pure, and instrumental logic after all have in common, in spite of their great diversity in many respects, which would adequately account for this common and serious defect? Do other types of logical theory, such as traditional formal logic, and idealistic logic, also share this predicament, though through lack of acuteness they fail to see it? Or are they really not troubled by it, due to some fundamental difference between these types and the infected ones?

Fortunately the answers to these questions are not far to seek. To the symbolic logician the phrase "deductive logic" means not only, or not primarily, what it has usually meant heretofore, namely, an analysis and exposition of *what* deduction is, but literally *being* a deductive procedure itself; but surely if it be circular (as Russell holds that it is) to attempt to establish the principles of induction inductively (in "inductive logic"), then it is also just as inevitably

circular to attempt to establish the principles of deduction deductively. Analogously, Husserl's thesis that one primary aim of logic is to show what makes a science science, complicated as it is by the further assumption that logic, being itself a science, *ipso facto* must be deductive, eventually lands him in the same predicament. And in Dewey's case, finally, his doctrine that *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* is precisely the same as "logic as inquiry into inquiry," while seemingly relieving him of the charge of at least an implicit inconsistency with respect to instrumentalism (i.e, that instrumentalism itself is not just instrumental, but is in some sense *true*), only does so at the exorbitant cost of compelling him explicitly to admit the justness of the charge of circularity. And here again the source of the predicament lies in the fact that logic is not only required to say *what* inquiry is, it is actually required to *be* inquiry.

On the other hand, neither traditional formal logic, nor idealistic logic, nor most of the other outstanding logical theories of the past have been troubled by this predicament simply because there has not been heretofore the same confusion regarding the aims of logic. It is a comparatively recent fashion to assume that logic, at one and the same time, must both say *what* "deduction" or *what* "inquiry" is, and also *be* deduction, or inquiry, at its theoretical best. And that this is indeed the ultimate source of the difficulty is only the more strongly confirmed in that logicians whose views and doctrines differ so widely and profoundly in other respects should yet agree in this one respect.

As for the necessary and sufficient justification of what may be called the principles of logic, logicians generally have heretofore appealed, either explicitly or implicitly, to the reader's presumed ability to see, to comprehend, that the principles, as enunciated, are actually *immanent in* deductive and inductive reasoning. In other words, the logician is merely engaged in making explicit the principles implicit in deduction, induction, and in their subordinate species and details, as illustrated both in scientific and other reasoning. Being general principles *in accordance with which* reasoning proceeds, rather than specific premises *from which* specific conclusions derive, they are *ipso facto* justified in the only possible way, and in a way that is actually far more substantial than any specific demonstration could possibly be. That being so, it is clear that it is an error in principle, a mistaken idea of its proper function, which is really responsible for the alleged predicament of logic. Relinquish the wholly extraneous notion that that portion of logic which attempts to show what deduction is, must itself be

deductive, or that the theory of inquiry—to use Dewey's terminology—has itself to be inquiry, and the predicament vanishes like mist before the noonday sun.

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BOOK REVIEW

Methodology of the Social Sciences. FELIX KAUFMANN. New York and London: Oxford University Press. 1944. viii + 272 pp. $3.50.

There are at least three kinds of investigators who call themselves logicians today: mathematical or deductive logicians, those who inquire into inquiry in the manner of Dewey, and then a band of intermediaries—those who try to use the methods of formal logic while inquiring into inquiry. Professor Kaufmann seems to fall into the third group. His subject is the methodology of the social sciences,[1] but he emphasizes on the first page of his preface that "methodology must be clearly distinguished from deductive logic," a conclusion to which he was led only after a study of Dewey's *Logic.*

The first half of his book is devoted to methodology in general. Naturally, what holds of all sciences will hold of the social sciences. The reader is led up the ladder slowly; he must learn his algebra, so to speak, before he gets his geometry. Therefore the first half of the book treats knowledge and reality, language and meaning, the basic rules of scientific procedure, causality, law, truth, probability, life, mind, and value. In spite of the title of the book, it is in this part that we must seek an original contribution. As suggested by the title of Part II, "Methodological Issues in Social Science," the second part is mainly polemical, and does not furnish many methodological propositions specifically true of the social sciences. More often the purpose is to criticize two disputants for failing to recognize a distinction made in the first half of the book. And the chief task of the first half is to clarify the meaning of the word "ground" as used in empirical science. This, Kaufmann

[1] The author writes in his preface: "Shortly after the publication of my *Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften* (Vienna, 1936), it was suggested that I write a similar book in English, and I started to work on it. But gradually it became a very different book." See a review of the German work, by V. J. McGill, this JOURNAL, Vol. XXXIII (1936), pp. 332–334.

In the later book less attention is paid to the concept of ideal-types and the philosophy of law. Moreover, there is less reference to phenomenological method and to Husserl and at least a brief recognition of the importance of Dewey's theory of inquiry.

says, "is tantamount to determining the criteria for the distinction between warranted and unwarranted assertions—in other words, to explicating the principles of scientific control" (pp. 1–2). He stresses "the contrast between deductive reasoning (in the strict sense) and empirical procedure," a contrast which is "closely related to the one between analytic and synthetic propositions" and which is the guiding principle of the analysis—"the key to the solution of many apparently unrelated methodological problems in natural and social sciences" (p. 3).

Professor Kaufmann's distinctive work is connected with the analysis of procedure in the empirical sciences; he develops his theory in chapters III–V. Empirical scientific thinking is called "a process of classifying and reclassifying propositions by placing them into either of two disjunctive classes in accordance with presupposed rules" (p. 40). The scientist accepts and rejects propositions, not arbitrarily, but with grounds. But the term "ground," Kaufmann argues, is ambiguous. Sometimes we speak of a proposition as a logical consequence of others, and say that the acceptance of the premise is the ground for the acceptance of the conclusion. But "ground" construed in this way is definable in terms of formal logic, in so far as the consequence-relation is a concept of formal logic. The other sense of "ground," so central in Professor Kaufmann's study, is that according to which we say that the acceptance of some proposition is ground for the acceptance of another, even where that other is not deducible from the first. In such cases we must make use of *empirical* rules of procedure, and these are the object of Kaufmann's special interest.

A distinction is made between the *corpus* of a science and its *structure*. The corpus is the set of propositions accepted, while the structure is defined in terms of rules of procedure. The scientist makes changes in the corpus; these changes are called "decisions." The rules of procedure state the conditions under which changes are to be made; they are rules of decision. Another term used is "scientific situation at a given time," which is defined as "the totality of synthetic propositions accepted at a given time." A rule of procedure, I gather, might read something like this: If the scientific situation satisfies the condition C, then to accept (or reject) the proposition p is a correct decision. It should be remarked that methodology, on Kaufmann's view, is the science which systematically presents these rules. Kaufmann's point is that if you were to present these rules of procedure, they would constitute a definition of *correct decision*, and therefore, ultimately, a definition of *science*. This is in imitation of the methodologist of the deductive sciences, who regards his transformation rules as a defi-

nition of the consequence-relation. It is fair to say that this book is a programmatic account of what methodology of the empirical sciences would be like. Here, Kaufmann is more interested in discussing the nature of these rules than in presenting them systematically.

A considerable amount of time is spent in analyzing the logical status of these rules. My sample formulation of a rule, it should be noticed, does not read "If the scientific situation satisfies the condition *C*, then scientists *do*, as a matter of fact, make decisions of type *D*." If this were a typical rule, it would amount to a description of how scientists actually behave. But Professor Kaufmann does not seem to adopt this view concerning his rules. However, when he asks how we justify the rules themselves, he answers unclearly. His problem is a difficult one because he can not prove semantically, as the deductive logician can, that his rules lead from true statements to other true statements. I quote two relevant passages:

> Can methodology legislate to science—so the question is often put—or must it content itself with describing the procedure of the scientist? . . . Sometimes this problem is posed by asking whether the rules of method are given *a priori* or whether they are conventions. To answer this question we must first be clear about what we mean by (*a*) "a priori," (*b*) "convention." If we associate with the term "a priori" the idea of irrefutable statements about reality, then the rules of science are not *a priori*. For since they are definitions, they do not make any assertions about reality at all. Furthermore, they are not *a priori* in the sense of being derivable (as are the rules of deductive reasoning) from the propositions to which they apply. But the rules are *a priori* in the sense that—again because they make no assertions about reality—they cannot be refuted by "experience" (observation); and they are *a priori* for science because "science" is defined in terms of them [pp. 46–47].

> Finally, it may be asked whether the *rules* are "objectively" given, and this question again may have two different meanings. It may refer to the "justification" of rules in terms of what we shall call "rules of higher order" or to the consensus of scientists regarding the rules. But the question of actual consensus is not one of the logic of scientific procedure [p. 56].

So far as I can make out, Professor Kaufmann claims that the definition of correct decision embodied in his (hypothetical) list of rules is, in effect, a definition of science. In so far as definitions are conventions, he would call his list a convention. In so far as he takes it to be a materially adequate definition in the sense of certain logicians, or as a correct analysis in the sense of certain philosophers, or one that conforms to usage, he thinks it is not arbitrary. But he complicates the issue when he talks about the conditions under which rules may be changed, especially when he introduces "rules of a higher order." This, it must be said, is a totally mysterious notion as it appears in this book. It is called

into play at numerous crucial points, but never developed. If it were, it might represent Kaufmann's solution to the problem he skirts. I have one hypothesis as to how Kaufmann *might* deal with this point, but I am not sure whether this is what he has in mind. Suppose, after Kaufmann had constructed his definition of *correct decision* (embodying as it would the rules in accordance with which a scientist would be expected to behave), a scientist (or a philosopher) should ask *why* he should accept these rules. One reasonable answer would be that these rules correctly analyze the concept of *correct decision*. A *proof* that they did would involve a definition of *correct analysis*, I suspect. Possibly Professor Kaufmann's rules of a higher order—the ones on the basis of which the others would be justified—would be the definition of *correct analysis*. But this is conjecture.

On the basis of his distinction between procedural rules and synthetic universal propositions Kaufmann rejects the view that induction is a species of deduction with the principle of uniformity of nature as a major premise. Rather, he argues, inductive inference is from a proposition of the form: *The proposition p is known* to one of the form: *It is correct to accept q*. He says: "Deductive inference shows that a synthetic proposition is implied by other synthetic propositions. Inductive inference shows that the acceptance of a proposition is *correct* in terms of presupposed rules. Thus what is derived is not the proposition itself—for the conclusion of a syllogism the major premise of which is a definition cannot be a synthetic proposition—but rather the correctness of its acceptance into science" (p. 80). This, I think, is an unfortunate passage, because it now appears that Kaufmann regards his *rule* as the major premise of a syllogism. If it is, then it can not function as a *rule* for getting from minor to conclusion. It becomes difficult to state just how Kaufmann's rules function concretely.

I have spent much time on Kaufmann's view regarding rules of procedure not only because it is the point to which he devotes most concentrated attention, but also because it turns up throughout the book. As soon as he has explained his view, he applies it at once to the problem of physical law and causality. He distinguishes between two types of laws in science: synthetic universal propositions ("empirical laws") and those which are really specific rules of procedure ("theoretical laws"), a distinction which was suggested to him, he says, by Dewey's distinction between generic and universal propositions. Whereas synthetic propositions may be falsified, rules of procedure may not. "Such a rule may have to be replaced by another *if it does not lead to the desired results* [my italics] and accordingly it may be affected by the nega-

tive result of an empirical test" (p. 85). But what is meant by the italicized phrase? It is not clear. When we change a rule we change the definition of "science," on Kaufmann's view, so that it would seem that *his* scientist would be perpetually revising the definition of "science" as he revised his theoretical laws. I am fully aware that Professor Kaufmann tries to meet this objection. He says that there are some rules which are more essential than others; these others may be altered without changing the definition. But you can't eat your cake and have it. If it is a rule of procedure, it forms a part of the definition of "correct decision." I can not see how Professor Kaufmann can introduce rules which are not *essential* parts of the definition. Either they are parts of the definition or they aren't, and if they aren't they can't share all the properties of rules. If they aren't essential parts of the definition, then, as far as Kaufmann is concerned, they are robbed of their charm. A scientist who surrenders them no longer does so on pain of ceasing to be a scientist if he doesn't; he does so because "it does not lead to the desired results," which is a very vague notion in Kaufmann's analysis.

Professor Kaufmann also applies his ideas about rules of procedure to the problems surrounding the concept of probability. He summarizes some current views on the subject—especially those of Keynes and the frequency school; he also refers to the controversy about whether "probability" means different things in different contexts. After agreeing that the frequency interpretation "is adequate as far as the term 'probability' relates to statistical laws," he goes on to consider the problem of the falsifiability of probability-laws. He points out the well-known fact that limit-statements are not falsifiable, and, as we might expect, leaps into the breach with his rules of procedure. This time, however, the rules are of a "higher order." Statements of relative frequencies in finite collections are construed as first-order specific rules of procedure, so far as I can gather from his very brief remarks. On the other hand, "a probability-law is not meant to be a statement about reality, i.e., a synthetic proposition, but *a scheme for the formulation of specific rules of procedure,* i.e., a procedural rule of higher order" (p. 108). Naturally, all the difficulties one has with Kaufmann's *first*-order rules carry over here, except that now one has the additional problem of establishing rules of a *higher* order, about which very little is said that is helpful. Also, if the *reason* for this flight to second-order rules is the fact that probability-laws are limit-statements, then Professor Kaufmann should be prepared to construe *all* the differential equations of physics as rules of procedure. This follows from the fact that they are

all limit-statements, and therefore not strictly falsifiable. One must observe that such an excision would leave very little in the corpus of physical science, and would lead us to construe an awful lot of seemingly empirical propositions as "not about reality at all." The social sciences, it should be added, are especially affected by this, for Kaufmann thinks they contain *only* theoretical laws, i.e., those that are disguised rules of procedure. It turns out that none of the propositions of social science which *seem* like propositions about the social world are really about that at all. I think that this is a rather extreme alternative; I see no reason for arguing that because a generalization is not strictly falsifiable by one instance, therefore it is a *rule*. This is especially objectionable when rules are interpreted as "not about reality at all."

Ethics does not escape; the rules of procedure are not without their application in the field of value, according to Kaufmann. Here they emerge as axiological rules in accordance with which evaluation is carried on. To say that something is good is to talk elliptically. What we really mean, according to Kaufmann, is that it is good with respect to the axiological rules, and when we expand the value-statement in this way, we are supposed to see that it is analytic. Evidently Professor Kaufmann contemplates a set of rules which will define "correct valuation" just as his others define "correct decision." The result, of course, is that value judgments take their place in that long line of judgments which "are not about reality at all." They go the way of so much of physics on Kaufmann's view, except that here he has much more support from other philosophers. Many who would be shocked at finding that assertions like "it is correct to accept p" are not about reality would find this result much more palatable in the case of ethics. But, in both cases Kaufmann accomplishes the end by a kind of logical sleight-of-hand, as it were, with logical mirrors. The conjuring is a little less surprising in the case of ethics, but at the same time a little more complicated. Kaufmann says: "a particular action a is called 'good' in terms of the axiological rules of utilitarian ethics by virtue of its being conducive to the happiness of a person. The proposition, [call it (1)] 'The action a is conducive to the happiness of a particular person,' is synthetic; the proposition, [call it (2)] 'a is good in terms of given axiological rules by virtue of its being conducive to the happiness of a particular person,' is analytic." Evidently the typical value-proposition resembles (2) on Kaufmann's view, and is therefore analytic (and therefore, "not about reality at all"). The fundamental question is: what reason does Kaufmann have for saying that the value-proposition has the form of (2)?

If "good" has been defined as "that which is conducive to the happiness of a particular person," then I suppose Kaufmann would regard this definition as a rule. And so, if I begin with the assertion that a particular action *a* has the property expressed by the *definiens*, I may, by applying the definitional rule, *deduce* that *a* has the property expressed by the *definiendum*. But the assertion that *a* is good must not be confused with the assertion that if *a* is conducive to the happiness of a particular person, then *a* is good. The latter conditional statement is analytic, and must not be confused with its consequent which is simply "*a* is good." The analyticity of the conditional implies nothing about either of its components. Nor should the statement "*a* is good" be confused with the metalogical statement "'*a* is good' may be deduced from '*a* is conducive to the happiness, etc.'" by applying the definitional rules (axiological rules). It follows that if "*a* is conducive to the happiness, etc." is synthetic, so is "*a* is good." The confusion is based on a logical error which is just as absurd as arguing that "*a* is a man" really is elliptical for "*a* is a man in terms of given rules by virtue of its being a rational animal."

When he comes to discuss the question of value in the social sciences, he relies heavily on the "distinction" we have just discussed. His point is that we should not use value terms in social science unless we refer explicitly to the "presupposed system of axiological rules," an injunction which amounts to neither more nor less than this: we should make clear what we mean by our value terms. But, of course, this condition holds for *all* our terms; we should always try to be clear about what we mean. I suppose that Professor Kaufmann is extremely sensitive to the high degree of ambiguity he finds in ethical discussion, and therefore he singles out ethical terms for special attention. I might add that the demand that we have these axiological rules in readiness should not be made too glibly. If we are not willing to define ethical terms *arbitrarily*, and if we think that the fundamental ethical notions have not yet been successfully analyzed, we will have trouble in constructing these axiological rules. Would Professor Kaufmann have the social scientist silence himself on value-questions because of our present inability to present an exact definition of "good"? I hope (and suspect) he is talking about an ideal state—a limit to be approached. To ask that social scientists wait upon the results of philosophical analysis before calling things right, wrong, good, or bad would be quite inappropriate—as inappropriate as it would be to ask that physicists suspend scientific judgment until the concept of *ground* is fully defined. But to ask them to keep trying to make these things clearer is undoubtedly justified. There is

too great a tendency in contemporary methodology to make methodological demands of social scientists which even physicists can not satisfy. Professor Kaufmann has made this point in other parts of the book. In general he adopts a sympathetic attitude toward the social sciences, and does not stand ready with methodological weapons, intent upon discrediting them. Methodologists who are more severe and (unfairly) exacting would do well to cast stones after they have used some in building their own science; it certainly needs them.

There are parts of Professor Kaufmann's book in which the notion of rules of procedure is not introduced as a panacea for our methodological ills. These parts frequently contain his most illuminating remarks—remarks that are clear and convincing. In his chapter on the mechanist-vitalist controversy, for example, he distinguishes two problems that are rarely kept separated: (1) whether "life" can be defined in terms of physics; (2) whether, when certain physical elements combine in a certain way, living beings come into existence. In his chapter on behaviorism and introspectionism he correctly points out that Carnap's reduction-sentences do not provide unique eliminability of terms conditionally defined, and that recent physicalism, therefore, does not hold that all psychological facts are physical facts. Points like these are not discussed at length, but they reveal soundness and philosophical understanding.

Professor Kaufmann is a man of great scope; he writes with facility about mathematics, sociology, and law. He absorbs what he regards as true wherever he finds it, ranging from Russell and Carnap, through Dewey, all the way to Husserl, Scheler, Mannheim, and Max Weber. He says his debt to Dewey is large, but this is not easy to see. Upon a careful reading the connection seems external. Dewey's distinctions and definitions are formulated in new terms, and one suspects that Dewey might reject Kaufmann's version of them. Kaufmann seems to regard Husserl's work as off in another field, more profound and fundamental. His analysis of "the logical constitution of thing-concepts" is said to represent an important advance beyond Hume and Kant, but none of it is presented. The matter stands differently with Weber, Scheler, and Mannheim, all of whom are dealt with in the second part of the book because of their preoccupation with the social sciences. Weber's definition of social behavior is discussed in chapter XII and accepted with qualification; I shall not discuss this here. The views of Mannheim and Scheler are treated in chapter XIV on "The Objectivity of Social Science," which, because of the current interest in the sociology of knowledge, will prove one of the more

stimulating chapters in the second part of the book. Kaufmann criticizes Mannheim for confusing the analysis of the meaning of terms like "knowledge" and "warranted behavior" with the sociology of scientific behavior. He says:

> Logically prior to the question of the origin of knowledge (the causal conditions of scientific progress) is the question of the meaning of "knowledge," in other words, of the distinction between warranted and unwarranted beliefs, and this distinction is *logically* dependent upon (defined exclusively in terms of) theoretical factors. "Scientific truth" ("empirical validity") is defined in terms of rules of procedure that determine the grounds for the acceptance and for the elimination of propositions, and these grounds are propositions accepted at the time of the decision, i.e., theoretical factors. No extra-theoretical factors are criteria of truth. But to state this is not to deny that the acquisition of knowledge—in other words, scientific progress—is *causally* dependent upon extra-theoretical factors. What we reject is the thesis that this fact has any bearing upon methodological (epistemological) problems (p. 188).

Kaufmann agrees that differently situated social scientists adopt different rules of procedure, but in such cases he thinks the differently situated scientists mean different things by the words "knowledge" and "science." He adds that he does not think an inquiry would reveal fundamental differences in the rules of procedure adopted by different groups. But suppose it did reveal fundamental differences, as an extreme sociologist of knowledge might claim. How would this affect Kaufmann's argument? Would he regard one set of rules as right and the other as wrong? This is not clear. Presumably the two different conceptions of science would reflect the actual procedures in their respective cultures, but would there be any super-historical criterion on the basis of which one might be regarded as more correct?

In conclusion it should be said that Professor Kaufmann's book is certainly provocative. I have not discussed his chapter on economic theory only because I have already gone far beyond the limits of a book review. Although I agree completely with his thesis that methodology of empirical sciences should be distinguished from deductive logic, I can not accept his analysis of the nature of methodology—or at any rate those parts of it that I have criticized here. Professor Kaufmann has written a stimulating book, parts of which should help clear up muddles in a field that has more than its share, but he has not presented us with a methodology of the social sciences (in his sense of "methodology"). It will be easier to discuss the *nature* of methodology when he does.

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BOOK NOTES

Religion and the World Order. A Series of Addresses and Discussions. Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. (Religion and Civilization Series.) New York: The Institute for Religious Studies. Distributed by Harper and Brothers. 1944. ix + 233 pp. $2.00.

Group Relations and Group Antagonisms. A Series of Addresses and Discussions. Edited by R. M. MacIver. (Religion and Civilization Series.) New York: The Institute for Religious Studies. Distributed by Harper and Brothers. 1944. ix + 237 pp. $2.00.

These two volumes contain papers given before the Institute for Religious Studies in the year 1942–1943. They have as their object the exploration of the background and principles of basic social issues. All the lecturers represented have one interest in common, a concern for the future of democracy and liberty. In terms of that interest, the contribution of religion to a new world order and the general problems of the relations of groups of all kinds in society are considered. The presentations, however, are necessarily brief and so tend to be superficial. Their common concern makes the speakers anxious to emphasize the area of agreement, and thus there is little meeting of minds and important differences are glossed over. In spite of these faults, apparent in most symposia, the volumes are informative and suggestive. They serve to warn us that the pathway that lies ahead for democracy is far from smooth.

A careful consideration of *Religion and the World Order* shows that, in spite of this common concern for democracy, there are some sharp divergences among democracy's well-wishers, both in their estimate of the present situation and in their recipe for the future. The disagreement is brought out in terms of the rôle of religion and religious institutions in a democratic and liberal society. A majority in this symposium claim that the difficulties of contemporary society show the moral and spiritual inadequacy of "secularism." F. Ernest Johnson, in the keynote lecture, presents a lucid and provocative account of the nature of this divorce of religion from society, and shows the consequences of private religion for society and the church. He insists on the church's right to make pronouncements on social and political problems and deplores the fact that the warnings of the churchmen are ignored. He is especially concerned about the evil effects of the separation of religion and education. This view is amplified in other lectures, notably those of Bishop McConnell and J. LaFarge. Their fundamental thesis is that re-

cent events have shown that without a religious foundation for morals, freedom and democracy can not be achieved in the social order. This thesis is accepted by most of these writers. The point of disagreement concerns the implications of this principle. Most of the contributors feel that it means that churches should enter more actively into political and social controversies. Tillich, on the other hand, distinguishes between religion as man's relation to the ultimate, in which sense it permeates all human activity, and religion as a set of symbols and overt actions. In the latter sense, it is a special sphere of human existence and should not interfere with the other spheres. There is no doubt that the contribution that can be made by religion to social reconstruction will vary from age to age depending on the religious spirit of the age and the position of the churches. If Dr. Johnson is correct in his estimate of our age, it appears rather futile to hope that religion will be a major factor. In so far as our age is secularist, the rôle of religion will be limited to heightening the perception of moral values. Reconstruction will be handled in economic, political, and cultural terms. The churches for their part are likely to function as critics for future plans. This makes relevant some of the later lectures which attempt to elucidate problems and prospects in various special fields. The papers by MacIver, Buell, Frank, Counts, and others indicate some of the dimensions of the problems to be solved. As one reads them it becomes more and more evident that, although religion does have a definite critical rôle, the problems are such that they must be handled by specialists. Democracy has discovered that it can not function without specialists, though it reserves the right to criticize and either approve or reject their recommendations. Religion can aid by crystallizing the moral basis for this criticism.

One of these many problems is considered in detail in *Group Relations and Group Antagonisms*. If anyone still doubts that war does not solve problems, this symposium will rid him of that doubt. It shows clearly that the present situation has sharpened the social conflicts and that sanity and information are required to deal with them. The papers, presented by spokesmen and experts, deal with national, ethnic, religious, and economic minorities. The accounts of minority persecution show evil incarnate. There is no rationalization adequate to the task of making this way of man's dealing with his fellow man appear plausible. Yet the picture is not black and white even here. Minorities persecute other minorities when the necessary conditions exist. It is as an examination of those conditions that the volume is valuable. As long as persecution is thought to originate in the weaknesses of human nature, the conflicts are in-

soluble. Holders of this view usually also claim that human nature is fixed and unchangeable. But when it is realized that persecution and group conflict arise from specific economic, social, and political conditions, improvement of the situation becomes possible. As conditions are changed, human attitudes change. Unfortunately we shall have to deal with this problem in a postwar world, one of war-weariness, disillusionment, and economic chaos, if previous experience is a reliable guide. Such a world furnishes optimum conditions for group conflict, so that it is difficult to be sanguine about the future in spite of our war-time slogans. Our only hope is a long period of peace and education. This volume is notable in that, in time of war, it educates in the spirit of peace.

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The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico. Translated from the Italian by MAX HAROLD FISCH and THOMAS GODDARD BERGIN. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1944. ix + 240 pp. $2.50.

As the senior translator notes, this is the first complete English version of any of Vico's writings, and is to be followed shortly by a translation of the *Scienza nuova.* The *Autobiography* is preceded by an informative and valuable Introduction of more than a hundred pages: the circumstances leading to Vico's self-portrayal are described, a good statement is supplied of Vico's philosophy of history, and his influence both in Europe and the United States is outlined. The *Autobiography* itself serves as a general survey of Vico's ideas and of the divergences between his theory of society and those of his contemporaries. Especially interesting are Vico's comments on mathematical reasoning and on the difference between the mathematical and historical sciences. The translators are to be congratulated upon an excellent performance of a task that was eminently worth doing; and students of the philosophy of history will await eagerly their publication of Vico's major work in English dress.

E. N.

OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW...Vol. LIII, 5. Naturalism and the Nature of Things: *Donald Williams.* What Is Man? *G. E. Mueller.* Discussion: The Different Kinds of *A Priori? Arthur Pap.* The Language of Poetry: *M. Whitcomb Hess.*

THE PERSONALIST. Autumn, 1944. The Animal Capable of Laughter: *R. T. Flewelling.* The Larger Logic: *J. W. Buckham.*

War-Mindedness and Totalitarianism: *Wilbur Long.* Personalism in Science and Democracy: *Wendell Thomas.* Religion and the Scientific Mind: *A. C. Garnett.* Mr. Adler and the Teacher in a Democracy: *M. Whitcomb Hess.* Cleverness in Literature: *Joseph Remenyi.*

We print below a list of selected articles from the following publications:

THE KENYON REVIEW. Summer, 1944. Paul Valéry: Poetics as an Exact Science: *Edouard Roditi.* The Hand that Writes the Credit: *Gorham Munson.*

THE HUMANIST. Summer, 1944. Gullible Man and a Decent Society: *M. B. Visscher.* The Penning in of Natural Science: *John Dewey.* The Humanist Tradition: *Corliss Lamont.* Humanism and its Mansions: *V. S. Yarros.* Must Democrats Have a Theology? *Brand Blanshard.*

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL. Vol. XLII, No. 4. Peace by Compulsion and Otherwise: *L. P. Jacks.* "A World Adrift": *Helen Wodehouse.* A Man and His Solitariness: *E. M. Rowell.* An Inner Conflict in the Christian Life: *W. S. Urquhart.* Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature: *S. H. Mellone.*

EDUCACIÓN. No. II, 1943. Esencia de la filosofía: *Santiago Monserrat.* La educación según la "Paideia": *Luz Vieira Méndez.*

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE. No. 131. Orthodoxie contre libéralisme. Un procès à reviser: *F. L. Leenhardt.* A propos de Copernic: *Rolin Wavre.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. 51, No. 5. Joseph Jastrow: 1863–1944: *W. B. Pillsbury.* Psychologists' Misuse of the Auxiliary Concepts of Physics and Mathematics: *I. D. London.* Psychological Measurement: Normative, Ipsative, Interactive: *R. S. Cattell.* The Awareness of Self and the Structure of the Ego: *Isidor Chein.*

FILOSOFIA Y LETRAS. Tomo VIII, Número 15. Don Andrés del Río y el primer libro de filosofía kantiana que hubo en México: *J. Hernández Luna.* La psicologia de la creacion artistoca: *Eduardo Nicol.*

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